Air Safety And Law

Many families whose loved ones have been involved in an aviation or other major transportation accident (including major highway, railroad and marine accidents) are unaware that the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has a website that provides important accident information. The website address is: http://www.ntsb.gov/.

For aviation matters, the website includes investigation materials for specific aviation accidents, general aviation safety issues and overall aviation accident data. The link is: http://www.ntsb.gov/AVIATION/Aviation.htm. Among other things, this section provides a listing by month of the preliminary, factual and probable cause reports for all accidents investigated by the NTSB.

Certain accidents or specific safety issues are the subject of NTSB board meetings and public hearings. The schedule for Board meetings is found at: http://www.ntsb.gov/events/boardmeeting.htm#upcoming. The schedule for public hearings is found at http://www.ntsb.gov/Events/hearing_sched.htm. Many of the hearings can be viewed through webcast links.
These proceedings provide significant insight into the inner workings of the NTSB and its investigative process.

Based on a recent study of aviation accidents, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has concluded that small airplanes equipped with glass cockpits do not have a better overall safety record than airplanes with old-style traditional instrumentation.

Significantly, the Safety Board determined that “because glass cockpits are both complex and vary from aircraft to aircraft in function, design and failure modes, pilots are not always provided with all of the information they need — both by aircraft manufacturers and the Federal Aviation Administration — to adequately understand the unique operational and functional details of the primary flight instruments in their airplanes.”

The NTSB Chairman Deborah A.P. Hersman stated that “while many pilots have thousands of hours of experience with conventional flight instruments, that alone is just not enough to prepare them to safely operate airplanes equipped with these glass cockpit features.”

In other words, even though the advanced technology of glass cockpits is supposed to provide more information, improve situational awareness and, as a result, make flying safer, the accident rate belies this notion.

And the NTSB has offered a common sense solution — MORE INFORMATION AND PILOT TRAINING.

Such training includes, among other things, requiring manufacturers to provide pilots with information to better manage system failures; incorporating electronic primary flight displays into training materials and aeronautical knowledge requirements; and, more training in glass cockpit simulators. The NTSB also highlighted the importance of reporting malfunctions or defects with electronic flight, navigation and control systems through the Service Difficulty Reporting system. As safety advocates we applaud this initiative and hope that the FAA, manufacturers and all of us pilots do their part to heed the NTSB’s call for action.

Today, the National Transportation Safety Board added improving the oversight of pilot proficiency as one of its most wanted aviation safety improvements. This addition was prompted in large part from revelations from the investigation into the Continental Connection Flight 3407 accident.

We are happy that the NTSB has highlighted the importance of proper pilot screening and monitoring. We hope that that the Federal Aviation Administration will act quickly on the recommendation to prevent anothe

On February 15, 2010, at approximately 3:45 pm, a small plane crashed at the Monmouth Executive Airport (formerly Allaire Airport) in New Jersey killing all five people aboard, including three members of a family visiting from Poland, among them a teenager and a young child.  An investigation by the National Transportation Safety Board and local authorities is continuing.

The plane is registered to Jack Air LLC and appears to correspond to an aircraft bearing FAA registration N12NA which was recently advertised for sale with a contact person named Jack Mazurek.  Mr. Mazurek was also onboard the plane.

The plane was apparently based at the Monmouth airport and was returning towards the runway when the crash occurred.  Reports indicate that the plane at taken off from Monmouth minutes before the crash and was supposed to be heading on a sight-seeing trip to New York.

The plane was reported, by eye-witnesses, to have been approaching the airport with its landing gear up and at a high rate of speed.  The plane was then observed to be pulled up to climb and parts of the plane, including the right wing, were observed to either fall off the plane or structurally fail in flight.

The 337 was first built by Cessna in 1964 and has a relatively unique design with one propeller engine in the nose of the plane, and another propeller engine at the rear of the plane in the same line.  The design is commonly referred to as a “push, pull” design and was intended to make the plane more controllable in the event that one engine fails (compared to having one of the two engines on either of the wings fail which causes the airplane to turn and can be harder to control).  The 337 was used by the military.  Cessna stopped making the 337 in 1980.

A Cessna 337 (shown without Riley conversion)

The accident plane appears to have been a 1976 model, but subsequently underwent a “Riley Rocket” conversion.  The “Riley Rocket” conversion upgrades the plane’s engines, avionics and airframe, among other things, and increases the speed and performance of the 337.

The NTSB has preliminarily determined that the flight maneuver was consistent with a return to the field for a low altitude, high speed, “fly-by” over the field.  If the pilot pulled the aircraft up at a high airspeed, it may have placed forces on the plane’s fuselage that were strong enough to break off parts of the plane, such as its flight control surfaces (the parts of the plane that control its flight)  thereby rendering it uncontrollable.   There was, apparently, a portable GPS system on board the plane which way help determine the aircraft’s speed which could assist in determining the precise cause of the crash and who may be responsible.  If the aircraft was materially altered by Riley in a way that compromised its structural integrity, there may be culpability on their part.

It was reported that family members of the passengers were still at the airport when the crash occurred.  Our thoughts are with the families of those that perished.

On February 6, 2010, at approximately 1:30 pm local time,  a Cirrus SR-20 airplane collided with a Piper Pawnee airplane, while the Pawnee was towing a glider near Boulder, Colorado. Three persons tragically died in the mid-air collision: Robert Matthews, the owner and presumed pilot of the Cirrus, his brother Mark Matthews who was a passenger (as well as a licensed pilot) and the pilot of the Pawnee, Alexander Howard Gilmer.  The glider operation was conducted by Mile High Gliding Inc.  The pilot and two passengers in the glider escaped serious injury when the glider pilot released the cable connecting the glider to the tow aircraft only seconds before the collision and then narrowly avoided the fireball that resulted from the impact of the Cirrus and the Pawnee.

The tow plane and glider were apparently climbing from East to West while the Cirrus appears to have been descending from North to South.  After the collision, the Cirrus was observed (and videoed) to be descending, on fire, under a parachute, which is part of the Cirrus Airframe Parachute System (CAPS).  The CAPS system was actually incorporated into the design of the Cirrus aircraft by its designer, Alan Klapmeirer, as a result of a mid-air accident he survived.

Being that I fly a similar model Cirrus aircraft, there are certain piloting and technological issues that concern me about this tragic accident.  First, while the “right of way” rules in aviation say that a glider and tow have the right of way over an airplane, this of course presumes that the aircraft see each other – or at least that the aircraft sees the tow and glider.  This apparently didn’t happen here, or not until it was too late.  All pilots have a duty to “see and avoid” each other, but that is sometimes easier said than done…  For instance, in low-wing aircraft, like the Cirrus, the wings can block the view of aircraft approaching from below, as the tow and glider may have been doing here.  From my military training, I remember how we were taught to scan across different sectors of our field of view, ie left to right, and also at varying depths of focus, ie far, medium, close…  But even that may not be enough if an aircraft is constantly blocked by aircraft structure.

It is for this among other reasons that technology generically referred to as ”Traffic Collision Avoidance Systems” (TCAS) was developed.  Such technology generally depicts where nearby planes are located on a GPS-like screen in the cockpit and gives relative bearing and altitude information, and some versions even direct the pilot how to avoid a potential collision.  Such technology is available on the Cirrus as an option (I have it on mine).  It is not clear whether this Cirrus involved in this collision had TCAS technology.  Even if it did, the technology requires the other aircraft to be electronically “transponding” its position, and even then the technology has been reported to not always work properly.

While it is too soon to know exactly what happened to cause this collision, one thing is certain; pilots should use as many resources as possible to minimize the risk of a mid-air collision including proper lookout, proper radio communications and available technology.

Many aviation safety advocates are aware of the National Transportation Safety Board’s “MOST WANTED LIST” which identifies the most pressing and important safety improvements needed in aviation safety. Notably, most of the recommendations are the result of actual investigations.

Presently the list highlights six critical items requiring improvement.  They are (1) reduce dangers to aircraft flying in icing conditions: (2) improve runway safety; (3) require image recorders [in the cockpit]: (4) reduce accidents caused by human fatigue; (5) improve cockpit resource management; and, (6) improve safety of emergency medical flights.

The NTSB tracks the actions being taken in response to the recommendations and categorizes the action as: (1) being assessed, classification to follow; (2) acceptable response, progressing timely; (3) acceptable response, progressing slowly; or, (4)unacceptable response. Remarkably all six items on the present list are assigned to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) for action and all six are categorized as “unacceptable response.”

While some of the recommendations require time, money and technological advances, many are common sense suggestions which can and should be implemented immediately. For example, what justification does the FAA have for not passing new regulations to monitor flight crew and air traffic controller fatigue? And why haven’t revised icing criteria been applied to currently certificated aircraft. I suspect that one of the reasons for inaction is the continuing conflict that lies at the heart of the FAA mission which, on the one hand, calls for the agency to be a watchdog over pilots and aviation operations and, on the other hand, requires them to promote aviation and the agenda of those they are policing. The other reason is undoubtedly a lack of resources, both money and personnel. We can only hope that the new administration will be more responsive because the present situation is frankly, “unacceptable.”

The National Transportation Safety Board has concluded its investigation into the Continental Connection (Colgan) Flight 3407 disaster and has issued very important safety recommendations, which if acted upon by Colgan, the other regional airlines and Federal Aviation Administration will greatly improve aviation safety. If the regional airline industry and the FAA do not act and act quickly another regional airplane will crash because other poorly selected and trained pilots will make the same or similar terrible mistakes as Flight 3407’s pilots.

Thus far, neither the Federal Aviation Administration nor the regional airline industry has taken the steps necessary to prevent the next disaster. In January, the Federal Aviation Administration issued a document entitled “Answering the Call to Action on Airline Safety and Pilot Training,” but the document is clearly just an attempt to blunt criticism of its half-hearted response to the Flight 3407 tragedy. The FAA has engaged in a lot of talk, but very little action. The same is true for the industry, much of which has committed to taking steps to improve pilot training and supervision, but thus far has largely not acted.

Colgan is a prime example of industry inaction. After “learning” that neither of Flight 3407 pilots had been fit for duty since they had gotten what little sleep they received the night before the flight in crew rooms, Colgan instituted a no questions asked fatigue policy that would not punish pilots for canceling flights because they were fatigued. Colgan then cancelled the new policy because its managers believed pilots were abusing the policy. Colgan also promised the National Transportation Safety Board that it would institute a Flight Operations Quality Assurance (FOQA) program, but as we approach the one year anniversary of the Flight 3407 disaster, its FOQA program is not operational.

We support the Flight 3407 families’ fight for change. Most regional airlines say that “safety is paramount” or that “safety is job one” — it’s time that these sayings are not mere words.

The tragic crash of Continental Connection Flight 3407 on February 12, 2009 should spur the FAA and the airline industry to change the rules and practices that lead to the disaster. On Tuesday, February 2nd, 2010, the National Transportation Safety Board will hold a hearing and most likely issue its probable cause report. We hope that the report focuses on the following:

1. Background checks of pilots. Colgan Air, which operated Flight 3407 under contracts with Continental Airlines, did not conduct a thorough background check on Flight 3407’s Captain and did not therefore discover that he had failed three check rides before applying for his Colgan job.

2. Fatigue. Pilots who are fatigued make mistakes and it is not enough for an airline to issue rules that pilots should not fly if they feel fatigued. If pilots are punished for missing flights an airline’s culture will cause pilots to take flights that they should cancel. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) should review each airline’s fatigue policies to make sure that they are non-punitive and that each airline’s culture promotes flight crews to use the fatigue policies.

3. Pilot Experience. We support increasing the minimum hours that pilots must have in order to fly commercially. Pilot experience, however, must focus on quality as well as hours. Right now, the Regional Airlines are able to hire and retain experienced pilots because the major carriers are not doing much hiring. What can’t happen is that Regional Airlines return to the practice of hiring less qualified pilots when the job market for pilots improves.

4. Pilot Training — Regional Airlines must invest significantly more on pilot training, especially with regard to emergency procedures. The training must cover every emergency and every possible emergency scenario. Classroom discussion is not a substitute for flight and simulator training.

5. Pilot Scheduling — The Regional Airlines need to improve their scheduling, not only so that pilots are not over-scheduled (which becomes a fatigue issue) but also to ensure that the schedule ensures that a flight crew with sufficient experience and professionalism is in each cockpit. Airlines should not be scheduling low-time and/or weak Captains with inexperienced co-pilots.

6. Improved systems on aircraft. We hope that the NTSB will recommend improvements to aircraft that would warn pilots earlier of problems. For example, a low airspeed alert would warn pilots that airspeed had dangerously decayed before the verge of a stall giving the pilots more time to react to a problem.

In late January, the FAA issued a report entitled “Answering the Call to Action on Airline Safety and Pilot Training, which appears to be the FAA’s attempt to get ahead of the NTSB’s release of its probable report. The report discusses a number of ongoing projects that address some of the issues discussed above. We hope that the FAA will continue to work on these projects once the media attention moves to other subjects.

The FAA and the Regional Airline industry are being pushed to action by the families of the Continental Connection Flight 3407 disaster. The families will not rest until they are confident that no other family will suffer what they have suffered.

While it may be impossible to prevent every accident, there should never be another accident like Continental Connection Flight 3407.

An Ethiopian Airlines plane carrying 90 people reportedly caught fire and crashed into the sea just after taking off from Beirut in bad weather very early Monday morning.

The most recent reports indicate that the pilots did not (and possibly could not) comply with air traffic control directions and conducted a unusual maneuver shortly before the crash.

It is too soon to rule out possible causes of the disaster and it is important for the investigators to determine whether there was a mechananical problem with the airplane.

Some commentators are speculating that there might have been a bird strike, engine failure or some other mechanical failure. Others are discounting the possibility that weather was a factor or that terrorism or sabatoge was at issue. I think it’s too soon to speculate about the cause and I am happy that the National Transportation Safety Board has dispatched a team to assist in the investigation.

This has been a tough couple of weeks for general aviation…  Last week I blogged about the crash of a Glasair near Oxford, CT, now there is word of a tragic crash near Bimini, The Bahamas which took the lives of 3 persons from Naples Florida including J.P. Antonmattei, a prominent Naples businessman.

This crash too has struck a chord with me.  I recently flew my plane down to the Bahamas this past December for a vacation.  The flying in The Bahamas is just beautiful, but it poses unique dangers that require special consideration.  Foremost is the obvious water danger.  Life preservers are a must, a raft is a good idea, and for my trip, I bought a PLB (Personal Locator Beacon).  A PLB sends a GPS position to a satellite when activated so that search and rescue can more accurately and rapidly locate you.

All this, of course, presupposes that you are able to survive the water impact, which unfortunately appears not to have been the case in this crash.  Again, you can be a very experienced pilot, and even have life saving equipment with you, but if your machine is not operating properly, all bets are off because now, rather than dealing with a challenging enough emergency landing on land, your situation is compounded by a water emergency landing (or “ditching”)….  Notwithstanding Sully Sullenberger’s outstanding  piloting accomplishment on the Hudsaon, a successful ditching is extremely demanding and remains a very dangerous “option” when a mechanical failure occurs over water.

It remains too early to know exactly what caused this tragic crash, but it is another sad reminder that flying over water poses unique considerations.  Our thoughts and prayers are with the families…